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LAW AND FACT PATTERNS
IN COMMON LAW WATER
POLLUTION CASES

lation of certain statutes, prescription and
the public trust doctrine.6 In addition, there
are a large number of cases which do not cite
any legal theory.

sis suggests when various theories might be
used and the likelihood of success for plaintiffs. This article includes a series of tables
showing the types of legal theories used in
cases in Missouri and surrounding states and
an appendix of Missouri water pollution
cases employing these various doctrines.

A. PRIVATE NUISANCE
Private nuisance is the most commonly
used legal theory to deal with water pollution, followed in 531 cases (38%)." A private
nuisance is defined as an unreasonable and
substantial nontrespassory interference with
the use and enjoyment of another's land,'
impairing the fitness of land for the ordinary
uses of life.' Typical examples of private
nuisances created by water pollution are
contamination of domestic, livestock, and
public water supplies; creation of odors interfering with places of habitation or employment; and destruction of the fertility of soil.

PART I
LEGAL THEORIES USED IN WATER
PoLLuTIoN CASES
used in common law water
theories
The
pollution cases are: private nuisance, public
nuisance, negligence, violation of riparian
rights (in eastern states), violation of prior
appropriation rights (in western states), violation of groundwater allocation rules, violation of diffused surface water rules, strict
liability, trespass, unconstitutional taking, vio-

B. PUBLIC NUISANCE
Public nuisance is the fourth most commonly used theory, followed in 181 cases
(13%).io A public nuisance is defined as an
unreasonable interference with a right common to the general public so as to endanger
or injure the property, health, safety, or
comfort of a considerabie number of persons-" Typicallexamples of public nuisances
cree;tedbywaterpolkstionare contamination
of pubic water supplies, a group of domestic
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allel state statutes2 are the primary
and parWater Act'
Clean
federal
he
of
regulating
the quality
sources
of law
surface watercourses and groundwater. Common law cases supplement regulatory law by
dealing with localized pollution problems
which comprehensive regulations cannot address. While the citizen suit provision in the
Clean Water Act allows private suits to require compliance with the Act,3 it does not
provide for individual damages.' Hence,
common law lawsuits have an important role
to play in protecting the individuals right to
water quality.
This article summarizes the various legal
theories used in 1401 common law lawsuits
involving water pollution and describes the
various factual circumstances under which
those theories have been used. 5 This analy-

REuLATON ch.
ENVIRONMENTAl
1 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1387 (1986). See generally, 1 F. GRAD, ENviRoNMEwA. LAw ch. 3(1973-1992); 1 J. DAVIDSON & 0. DoF. , FEDERAL
LAw (2d ed. 1986, supp. 1992); 5 WATER ANDWATER
2 (1989); S. NovicK & M. MELLON, LAw OF ENvIRoNMENTAL. PRoTECnoN ch. 12 (1987-1992); 2 W. RODGERs, ENVIRONMENTAL
RIGHTs (R. Beck 2d ed. 1991, supp. 1992); Davis. Federal and State Water Quality Regulation and Law in Missouri, 55 Mo. L. REv. 411 (1990) Ihereinafter cited as Water
Quality Regulation]
2 See. e.g., Missouri Clean Water Law. RSMo §§ 644.006-.141 (1986, supp. 1992). See generally. 1 Missouni ENVIRONMENTAL LAw ch. 8 (1991-92); Davis, Water Quality
Regulation. supra note .
3 Clean Water Act § 505(a)(1), 33 U.S.C. § 1365(a)(1) (1986). See generally, Davis, Water Quality Regulation, supra note , at 434-38. There is no citizen suit provision
in the Missouri statute.

4 Middlesex County Sewerage Auth. v. National Sea Clammer Ass'n, 453 U.S. 1 (1981); City of Evansville v. Kentucky Liquid Recycling. Inc., 604 F.2d 1008 (7th Cir.
1979). cert. denied 444 U.S. 1025 (1980)
5 This article isdrawn from review of over 1350 cases nationwide, the vast bulk of all reported cases. These cases have been found through the use of digests, electronic legal
data bases. examination of prior cases cited in cases, and Shepards. No single research technique reveals more than a small portion of all reported cases. My forthcoming book
on water pollution law and regulation will be the first publication with a comprehensive list of cases, listed by theory and jurisdiction. Those lists will contain notations of the fact
situations and legal results in each case. This article will cite many representative cases, but for space reasons contains a comprehensive list only for Missouri.
6 Some of these theories, particularly private and public nuisance. violation of riparian rights and violation of groundwater allocation rules, have been discussed in published treatises
and articles. Others have not been discussed before. See, e.g., 1 RoDEts. supra note , ch. 2, at 28-168; 1 F. GRo. supra note, §§ 3.02(1), 3.05(3); D. Sami & K. MANASTER,
STATE ENVIRONMENTAL LAw chs. 3-4 (1989-1992); Davis. Water Quality Regulation, supra note , at 484-502; Davis. Protecting Waste Assimilation Streamflows by the Law
of Water Allocation, Nuisance. and Public Trust, and by Environmental Statutes. 28 NAT. RESOURcVs J. 357 (1988): Davis. Groundwater Pollution: Case Law Theories
for Relief, 39 Mo. L. REv. 117 (1974) Ihereinafter cited as Groundwater Pollution]; Davis. Theories in Water Pollution Litigation. 1971 Wis. L. REv. 738 [hereinafter cited
cited as Private Remedies 735-744.
as Water Pollution Litigation]; Comment, Private Remedies for Water Pollution. 70 Co um. L. Rev. 734. 738-44 (1970)
7 See Table A.
2D. ToRTs§822.832.849(1979); Krienerv. Turkey Valley CommunitySch. Dist., 212 N.W.2d 526.531 (Iowa 1973)lschool sewagelagoon effluent discharged
8 RESTATEMENT
into stream caused odors around farmhouse and polluted livestock waterl. On Missouri private nuisance law generally, see Comment, The Law of Private Nuisance in Missouri.
44 Mo. L. Rtv. 20 (1979)
9 Bower v. Hog Builders. Inc., 461 S.W.2d 784. 795-97 (Mo. 1970) Ifeedlot sewage lagoon effluent flowed across boundary, causing odors and polluting a livestock watering
pond); Sterling v. Velsicol Chem. Corp., 647 F.Supp. 303. 319 (W.D. Tenn. 1986). off d in part, rev'd in part 855 F.2d 1188 (6th Cir. 1988 -Tenn.) Ileachate from unlicensed
chemical waste landfill polluted domestic wells).
10 See Table A.
1979) )leachate
1981) off'd 396 N.E.2d 552 (111.
2D. Tom § 821B (1977); Village of Wilsonville v. SCA Serv.. Inc.. 426 N.E.2d 824. 834 (111.
11 RESTATEMENT
from hazardous waste landfill allegedly would pollute groundwaterl; New York v. Shore Realty Corp., 759 F.2d 1032, 1050 (2d Cir. 1985) thazardous waste storage

[hereinafter

facility leaks polluted groundwater.
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or livestock water supplies, or creation of
widespread odors interfering with places of
habitation or causing nausea and illness.
A public nuisance suit usually is enforceable only by a public official, such as a public
health officer or prosecuting attorney;12 but,
if an individual is specially damaged or injured, a public nuisance may be enforced
independently by the individual.' 3
C. NEGLIGENCE
Negligence isthe second most commonly
used theory, followed in 271 cases (19%)."
Negligence is "conduct which falls below the
standard established by law for the protection of others against unreasonable risk or
harm," and involves a want of care, or an
activity not conducted in a reasonable and
prudent manner.' 5 Negligence focuses on
conduct, rather than on consequences.' 6 It
isdirected at the predictability of the contamination or of the injury or damage caused by
defendant's activity, not at the degree or
nature of that injury or damage."
D. RIPARIAN RIGHTS

12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19

RESTATEMENT
2D, TORTs
RESTATEMENT
2D, TORTs

See Table A.
RESTATEMENT
2D, ToRTS
RESTATEMENT
2D. TORTS

Riparian rights is the third most commonly used theory, followed in 222 cases
(16%)." The riparian doctrine is employed
universally by thirty-one states in the eastern
United States, including Missouri, to allocate
water in watercourses between users. It is
employed in cases involving pollution of
watercourses as well, because the doctrine
has always had a qualitative component in
addition to its better known quantitative
component.
The riparian doctrine provides that each
landowner whose land abuts a watercourse
has a coequal right to use a fair share of the
water supply. Each riparian has two contradictory rights. First, each riparian is entitled
to natural flow, that is,to have the water flow
in its natural quantity and quality. Second,
each riparian on the watercourse has an
equal right to make reasonable uses of that
water, including consumptive uses, even if
some alteration in quantity, quality, or flow
pattern occurs.' 9 Reasonableness is determined by comparing the claimant riparian's
uses with those of the other affected riparians.
Each state has had to emphasize either

natural flow right or the reasonable use right.
Twenty-five of the thirty-one eastern states
have adopted the reasonable use emphasis
of the riparian doctrine,20 which allows each
riparian to make reasonable uses even if
some alteration in quantity, quality, or flow
pattern occurs.2 ' Six states continue to follow the natural flow emphasis.2 1
The riparian doctrine applies to waste
discharges as well as to water uses. 3 The
natural flow concept requires that there be
no adulteration of natural water quality and
that the natural purity be maintained.24 The
reasonable use concept allows a reasonable
use of water, even if some lessening of
natural water quality occurs." Comparative
reasonableness is the standard employed in
most riparian pollution cases.2 6 That some
waste discharges are permitted under the
reasonable use concept of riparian rights is
made evident by cases accepting the concept
and denying relief because they did not
unreasonably interfere with other riparian
uses. 27
E. PRIOR APPROPRIATION

§ 821C(2)(b) (1977); AttorneyGeneral ex rel. Township of Wyoming v. City of Grand Rapids, 141 N.W. 890, 900 (Mich. 1913).
§§ 821C(1), 821C(2Xa) (1977); Schoen v. Kansas City, 65 Mo.App. 134. 138 (1895).
§ 282 (1965); Green v. Asher Coal Mining Co., 377 S.W.2d 68, 70 (Ky. 1964).
§ 282 (1965) ("negligence isconduct"); Nelson v. C & C Plywood Corp., 465 P.2d 314, 319 (Mont. 1970).

Ressler v. Gerlach, 149 A.2d 158, 160 (Pa. 1959) (defendant should have known his conduct would lead to another's injury).
See Table A.
Bollinger v. Henry, 375 S.W.2d 161 (Mo. 1964). On the ripanian doctrine generally, see 1 WATER ANDWATER RIGrs, supra note , § 6 .01(a)(34), 7.02-.03; A. TARLocK.
LAw oF WATER RIGHTS ANDRESOURCES
ch. 3 (1988-92); Davis. Water Quality Regulation, supra note , at 432-39.
20 Alabama, Arkansas, Delaware, Florida, Georgia, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Louisiana, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts. Michigan, Minnesota. Mississippi, Missouri, New
Hampshire, New York, Pennsylvania. South Carolina, Tennessee, Vermont, Virginia, West Virginia, and Wisconsin.
21 Harris v. Brooks. 283 S.W.2d 129 (Ark. 1955); Pyle v. Gilbert, 265 S.E.2d 584 (Ga. 1980).
22 Connecticut, Kentucky, New Jersey, North Carolina, Ohio. and Rhode Island. See, e.g., McCord v. Big Bros. Movement, 185 A. 490 (N.J. 1936); RFSTATEMENr 2D. TORmS
§ 850 (1978).
23 On the water quality aspects of the riparian doctrine generally, see 1 WATER AND
WATER RIGHTs, supra note , § 7.03(e); A. TARLOCK,, supra note . § 3.13: 1 W. RODGERS.,
supra note , § 2.19; Davis, Water Quality Regulation, supra note , at 489-90; Davis, Water Pollution Litigation. supro note, at 742-49; Comment. Private Remedies,
supra note , at 735-38.
24 Beaunit Corp. v.Alabama Power Co., 370 F.Supp. 1044,1052 (N.D. Ala. 1973) [peak hydroplant operation reduced minimum flow need for waste assimilation by industrial
waste treatment plantl; McArthur v. Mt. Shasta Power Corp.. 45 P.2d 807, 815 (Cal. 1935) (hydroelectric diversion caused stagnation of livestock & irrigation water supply);
H.B. Bowling Coal Co. v. Ruffner 100 S.W. 116, 119 (fenn. 1906) lacid mine drainage pumped into stream corroded factory boiler and polluted domestic & livestock water
supplyl.

25 Tetherington v. Dank Bros. Coal & Coke Co., 83 N.E. 1048. 1049 (111.
1908) Icoal mine debris covered farmland after tailings settling in reservoir washed out; Ferguson
v. Firmenich Mfg. Co., 42 N.W. 448, 449 (Ia. 1889) Isugar beet refuse discharged into stream polluted domestic & livestock water supplyl.
26 Borough of Westville v. Whitney Home Builders, 122 A.2d 233 (N.J.Super 1956); For a functional analysis of how the riparian rights doctrine has been applied to water
pollution cases. see W. RoDcEs, supra note , § 2.19.
27 See e.g. Ferguson v. Firmenich Mfg. Co., 42 N.W. 448. 449 (la. 1899) [sugar beet refuse discharged into stream polluted domestic & livestock water supply - allegations
not provedl; Helfrich v. Catonsville Water Co.. 22 A. 72. 73 (Md. 1891) Icattle in stream polluted public water supply - trial court injunction quashed).
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Patterns in Common Law Water Pollution Cases
Prior appropriation theory is used in ten
western cases (1%).21 The 18 western states
follow the prior appropriation doctrine in
allocating water between users. 29 The prior
appropriation doctrine provides that users
are entitled to take their full appropriations
of water in historic chronological order of
first use until the water supply is exhausted.
In times of shortage, the latest appropriators
will be cut off in inverse historic order until
demand equals supply. That chronological
allocation is described by the maxim "first in
time, first in right."Io Beginning in 1890, all
western states enacted statutory permit systems and established state agencies to administer prior appropriation rights.
Many prior appropriation waste discharge
cases hold that a senior appropriator cannot
expect to retain natural quality of flow, but
must expect some deterioration in quality by
the activities of upstream junior appropriators. However, the senior appropriator is
entitled to be free from unreasonable interference with the fair enjoyment of their prior
appropriative right by material deterioration
of water quality, t and some cases hold that
an upstream junior appropriator may cause
no degradation.
Courts in most western states have not
determined the water quality rights of junior
appropriators. But the few jurisdictions considering the question disagree whether a
downstream junior appropriator must accept degraded water quality resulting from a

senior appropriator's use. The California
and Washington courts hold that the junior
user takes the water as they find it, both in
quantity and quality; pollution resulting from
a senior user's lawful use is considered part
of the senior appropriator's user By contrast, the Colorado and Montana courts have
held that by rendering the watercourse unfit
for diversionary uses by a junior user, a
polluting senior user had unlawfully
appropriated the entire flow of the watercourse.
In prior appropriation states, pollution by
nonappropriators is handled under other
doctrines.
GROUNDWATER ALLOCATION
RULES
Groundwater allocation rules have been
used in thirty-eight cases (3%).1 The courts
have developed several rules for allocating
groundwater between conflicting users. Conflicts involving use, diversion and obstruction
of water in identifiable underground streams
are governed by the rules which allocate
water in surface watercourses: riparian rights
in the eastern states" and prior appropriation in the western states by statute.37 Conflicts involving use, diversion and obstruction
of percolating groundwater are governed by
one of several allocation rules: absolute
ownership rule, American "reasonable use"
rule, comparative reasonable use rule, western "correlative rights" rule, and prior appro-

F.

priation rule.
The prior appropriation doctrine applies
the same rules for groundwater as it does for
surface water, and thus will not be discussed
again. The western "correlative rights" doctrine will not be addressed in this article.
One might expect that those same rules
would govern pollution of groundwater since
the practical consequences of groundwater
contamination are no different than those of
diversion or obstruction. In both instances,
the neighboring landowner is deprived of the
use of groundwater. But such is not the case.
In the vast majority of groundwater pollution
cases, either nuisance or negligence law is
employed. Less than a handful of cases use
groundwater allocation rules to decide pollution cases. Perhaps this reflects an unstated
observation that a groundwater polluter is
denying access to water the polluter is not
using.
1. Absolute Ownership Rule
The absolute ownership rule provides that
a landowner can use percolating groundwater in any amount and at any place without
liability for injurious consequences to neighbors.38 Today the absolute ownership rule
continues to be followed by 8 states. 9 The
water pollution cases employing the absolute ownership rule state two reasons why
the rule is appropriate: (1) since there is no
method for the well driller to determine the
movement of percolating groundwater be-

28 See Table A.
29 Alaska. Arizona. California, Colorado, Idaho. Kansas, Montana. Nebraska, Nevada, New Mexico, North Dakota, Oklahoma, Oregon, South Dakota. Texas, Utah, Washington,
and Wyoming. On the prior appropriation doctrine generally, see 2 WATER ANDWATER RiGHTs. supra note . §§ 12.01-.03. 13.01-.04, 17.01-.03; A. TAnLoCK,, supra note , ch.
5; 1 W.HLrrcHiNs, WATER RiGrs LAWs oF THE NiNETEEN WEsTERN STATEs cc. 7-9 (U.S. Dep't Agric. Mis. Pub. No. 1206, 1971).
30 Gunnison-Fayette Canal Co. v. Gunnison Irrigation Co., 448 P.2d 707 (Utah 1%8); Irwin v. Phillips, 5 Cal. 140 (1855).
31 Arizona Copper Co. v. Gillespie, 100 P. 465, 470 (Ariz. 1909), affd 230 U.S. 46 (1913) [copper ore tailings covered irrigated farmlandl.
32 See e.g. Wright v. Best, 121 P.2d 702, 709 (Cal. 1942) lore crushings discharged into stream polluted domestic & irrigation waterl.
33 Conrad v. Arrowhead Hot Springs Hotel Co., 37 P. 386. 387 (Cal. 1894) [hotel spa domestic wastes polluted domestic & irrigation water in ditch diverting water from
streaml; McEvoy v. Taylor. 105 P. 851, 853 (Wash. 1909) [farm animals & geese polluted livestock waterl.
34 Suffolk Gold Mining & Milling Co. v. San Miguel Consol. Mining & Milling Co., 48 P. 828, 832 (Colo. Ct.App. 1897) lore milling wastes eroded industrial hydroelectric
machinery); Atchison v. Peterson, 87 U.S. (20 Wall.) 507. 515, (1874), aff d 1 Mont. 561 (Mont. 1872).
35 See Table A.
36 Tampa Waterworks Co. u. Cline, 20 So. 780,784 (Fla. 1896); Kevil u.City of Princeton, 118 S.W. 363,365 (Ky. 1909) (by implication); Rose v. Socony Vacuum Corp.,
173 A. 627, 630 (R.I. 1934).
37 On the application of prior appropiation to groundwater generally. see WATER AND WATER RICTs, supa note 1, §§ 24.01-.07, A. TARLocK, supro note 16, c.6.
38 Dillon v. Acme Oil Co., 2 N.Y.S. 289. 290-91 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1888) [refinery residues polluted domestic weil. On the absolute ownership nmlegenerally, see 3 WATER AND
WATER RIGHS. supra note, §§ 21.01--07; A. TARLOCK, supra note . § 4.04; Davis, Wells and Streams: Relationshipat Law, 37 Mo. L. REv. 189, 201-02 (1972) [hereinafter
cited as Wells and Streams].
39 Connecticut, Georgia, Louisiana, Massachusetts. Pennsylvania. Rhode Island. South Carolina and Texas.
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fore drilling, it is not fair to impose liability,40
and (2) imposing liability would deter economic development.4 ' The absolute ownership rule gives an almost absolute immunity
to groundwater polluters by permitting landowners to inject wastes into groundwater or
to contaminate it. Apparently because of
that draconian absence of liability under the
rule, there are no cases granting relief under
the absolute ownership rule.
2. American Rule
The second groundwater allocation rule is
the "American rule," sometimes misdesignated as the "reasonable use rule." It
provides that a landowner may use as much
groundwater as desired without liability for
the adverse effects on any neighbor's groundwater supply, provided the groundwater is
used on property owned by the landowner.
The landowner also may make any use of the
land affecting the movement of percolating
groundwater without liability.42 It is important to recognize that the rule does not call
for a comparison of the landowner's uses
with the uses made of the groundwater by
the adversely affected neighbor. Today the
American rule is followed by nine states.
Until the last decade there were no water
pollution cases granting relief under the
American rule. But the concept of the rule,
although a variant of absolute ownership,
ought to impose liability for off-site contamination of groundwater, because the rule

prohibits off-site groundwater use. A case in
the last decade confirms that interpretation
and imposed liability for off-site groundwater
contamination.4
3. Comparative Reasonableness Rule
The third rule of groundwater allocation
has no commonly accepted name. It employs the same concept of comparative rea
sonableness employed in the riparian doctrine for surface watercourses. It provides
that a landowner may use groundwater only

"The common enemy rule
provides that drainage
water is a scourge which
each landowner is entitled
to remove by any physical
means available."
to the extent that it does not unreasonably
reduce the amount of groundwater available
to any neighbor. 45 Comparative reasonableness was applied to groundwater use situations because courts perceived both the
absolute ownership rule and the American
rule to be unfair to the adversely affected
groundwater user, especially where the
groundwater diverter was thought to be
overreaching.4

Like the riparian rights doctrine from
which it is derived, the comparative reasonableness rule has a water quality dimension
which forbids groundwater contamination
that unreasonably interferes with groundwater use by others.47 Today comparative reasonableness isapplied to groundwater use in
17 states, including Missouri. 48
G. DIFFUSED SURFACE WATER
RULES
Cases involving pollution of drainage or
diffused surface water are relatively uncommon compared to surface watercourse and
groundwater pollution cases, totaling only
twenty-two cases (2%).49 Although the courts
have developed several rules for dealing with
unwanted diffused surface water, few drainage pollution cases use those rules. The
three rules are the common enemy rule, civil
law rule, and reasonable use rule.'
One would expect that drainage pollution
cases using diffused surface water rules would
follow the logical implications of those rules;
that is, pollution of drainage would be allowed under the common enemy rule, no
pollution would be allowed under the civil
law rule, and pollution that is not unreasonably excessive would be allowed under the
reasonable use rule. Courts have imposed
liability for polluting drainage water under all
three rules, however, holding respectively
that each rule bars such pollution.

40 Rose u. Socony- Vacuum Corp.. 173 A. 627. 630 (R.I. 1934).
41 Phillips u. Sun Oil Co., 121 N.E.2d 249, 251 (N.Y. 1954).
42 United Fuel Gas Co. v. Sawyers, 259 S.W.2d 466,468 (Ky. 1953) Igas well leak polluted domestic welll; See generally, 3 WATER ANDWATER RIcrrs, supra note , §§ 23.01.03 [combining discussions of the American and comparative reasonableness rules]; A. TARL.CK. supra note , § 4.05; Davis, Wells and Streams, supra note , at 202-03.
43 Alabama, Indiana, Iowa, Kentucky, Maine, Maryland, New York, North Carolina and West Virginia.
44 Hughes u. Emerald Mines Corp., 450 A.2d I (Pa. Super. Ct. 1982) (acid mine wastes polluted wells].
45 See generally, 3 WATER ANDWATER RIirrs, supra note, §§ 22.01-.08 (combining eastem comparative reasonableness and western correlative rights cosharing rules], 23.01.03 (combining American and comparative reasonableness rulesl; Davis, Wells and Streams, supro note , at 203-04.
46 Jones u. Oz-Ark-Val Poultry Co.. 306 S.W.2d 111 (Ark. 1957); Higday v. Nickolaus, 469 S.W.2d 859 (Mo. Ct.App. 1971).
47 Bridgman v. Sanitary Dist., 517 N.E.2d 309, 312 (111.
App. Ct. 1987) (rejecting absolute ownership) (digging of ditch diverted groundwater and caused degraded water from
other sources to pollute domestic wellI; North-East Coal Co. v. Hayes, 51 S.W.2d 960,962 (Ky. 1932) (mining subsidence caused pollution of domestic & livestock well of overlying
surface ownerl.
48 Arizona, Arkansas. California, Delaware, Florida, Illinois, Michigan, Minnesota, Missouri, Nebraska, New Hampshire, New Jersey, Ohio, Tennessee. Vermont. Virginia. and
Wisconsin.
49 See Table A.
50 On diffused surface water law generally, see Comment. The Reasonable Use Rule in Surface Water Law, 57 Mo. L. REv. 223 (1992); 2 WATER ANDWATER RiGHTs, supra
note .§ 10.03; 5 id. § 59.02(b); Davis. Law of Diffused Water in Eastern Riparian States, 6 CONN. L. REv. 227 (1974); Maloney & Plager. Diffused Surface Water: Sourge
or Bounty? I NAT. RESOURCES
J. 72 (1968); Dolson, Diffused Surface Waterand Riparian Rights: Legal Doctrines in Conflict. 1966 Wis. L. REv. 58; Annot.. Modem Status
of Rules Governing Interference with Drainage of Surface Waters, 93 A.L.R.3d 1193 (1979).
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Patterns in Common Law Water Pollution Cases
1. Common Enemy Rule
The common enemy rule provides that
drainage water is a scourge which each
landowner is entitled to remove by any
physical means available. Hence, each landowner may deal with, dispose of, block, or
divert diffused surface water in any manner
without legal liability for the injurious consequences to neighbors' lands. This gives the
upper landowner the right to discharge drainage on lower neighbors and it gives the lower
landowners the right to block drainage and
to pen it back on upper neighbors. It encourages hydraulic warfare and lack of concern
for neighbors. Twelve states follow the common enemy rule, including Missouri.
This laissez faire approach would suggest that the upper dominant landowner
could pollute drainage water at will. But
nearly all of the few cases which have considered the question have barred discharges of
polluted drainage water.52 Evidently, those
courts consider polluted drainage water to be
of a different character than unpolluted drainage water. But a pair of Missouri cases
suggests that perhaps de minimis pollution
in drainage water may not be actionable.'
2. Civil Law Rule
The civil law rule provides that drainage
must be allowed to follow its natural courses.
The upper landowner is not allowed to
redirect drainage artificially; the lower land-

owner is forbidden to obstruct natural drainage. The purpose of the rule is to preserve
the natural drainage pattern and to prohibit
landowners from taking unfair advantage of
each other. Seventeen states follow the civil
law rule.'
. One would expect the civil law rule, which
bars alteration of natural drainage flow, would
also bar pollution of drainage water. In fact,
there are eight civil law rule cases involving
polluted drainage water and all but one
granted relief.'- One case, however, suggests that the lower servient land must accept contaminants in drainage water resulting from a reasonable use of the upper
dominant land."
3. Reasonable Use Rule
Under the reasonable use rule, each landowner is allowed to dispose of, block, or
divert drainage in ways which do not unreasonably interfere with the use of a neighbor's
land. The rule compares the benefits and
hardships caused by a change in the natural
drainage pattern. Ifthe hardships are unreasonable under all the circumstances, there is
liability. 7 The reasonable use rule is followed
in eighteen states.
As is true for the analogous comparative
reasonableness balancing process employed
for surface watercourses and groundwater,
the theory of the reasonable use nde sugy
geststhatdrainagewatermaybedegraded in

quality so long as it does not cause an
unreasonable interference; however, there
are no cases so holding. Instead, the only
case in point holds that the reasonable use
rule does not permit drainage water to contain a waste discharge, since that would add
a burden to the lower servient lands."
H. STRICT LABILITY
The doctrine of strict liability has been
applied in forty eight cases (3 %).6 Ithas been
employed more frequently in cases of groundwater pollution and underground contaminant flow (thirty-one cases) than in surface
watercourse pollution cases (fourteen cases),
or in drainage water pollution cases (four
cases).6 '
The formulations of the definition of situations calling for strict liability vary between
the states. Most commonly, activities give
rise to strict liability when they are "abnormally dangerous," because of their propensity to cause injury or damage or because of
the extensive harm which results from their
going. out of controL The persons engaging
in such activities should be expected to
compensate for consequential injuries and
damage, because it is wmreasonable and
contrary to pubic poky to expect the injured or damaged persons to assume the
burden of injury or damage under any circunstances. More water pollution cases have
employed the common law version of the
rule" rather than the RESTATEMENT (SECOND)

51 Arizona. Arkansas. Indiana. Maine, Missouri. Montana. Nebraska, New York, Oklahoma. South Carolina, Virginia, and Washington.
52 Baltzeger v. Carolina Midland Ry., 32 S.E. 358. 359-60 (S.C. 1899); G.L. Webster Co. v. Steelman, 1 S.E.2d 305, 312 (Va. 1939) Icannerywaste discharged into drain
leading to creek & estuary caused odors and killed shellfish - damages granted for odors on nuisance theory, but damages denied for loss of seafood").
53 Casanover v. Villanova Really Co., 209 S.W.2d 556 (Mo. Ct. App. 1948), denied relief for a clay deposit of several inches settling out of drainage water. Later, Wells
v. State Highway Comm 'n. 503 S.W.2d 689 (Mo. 1973), granted relief for a massive silt deposit settling out of drainage water.
54 Alabama. Colorado, Georgia. Idaho. Illinois. Iowa, Kansas. Louisiana, Maryland, Michigan. New Mexico, Oregon. Pennsylvania. South Dakota, Tennessee, Texas. and
Vennont
Ct. App. 1957) lacid mine drainage discharged into ditch flowed into adjacent timberland, killing trees];
55 See e.g. Fenwick v. Bluebird Coal Co.. 140 N.E.2d 129, 131 (111.
Harbison v. City of Hillsboro. 204 P. 613. 618 (Or. 1922) Icity treated sewage effluent plugged drainage ditch with sediment and penned back drainage water.
56 Niagara Oil Co. u. Jackson, 91 N.E. 825, 827 (Ind. Ct. App. 1910).
57 RESIATrMENr 2D. TORTS. § 821A - 833 (1979). applying private nuisance law.
58 California. Connecticut. Delaware, Florida, Kentucky, Massachusetts, Minnesota, Mississippi. Nevada. New Hampshire, New Jersey. North Carolina, North Dakota. Ohio.
Rhode Island. Utah. West Virginia, and Wisconsin.
59 Kallevig a Holgren, 197 N.W.2d 714, 718 (Minn. 1972) lapartment septic tank effluent. combined with pothole drainage, was directed onto neighboring land, poisoning
the soill.
60 See Table A.
61 See Tables B-D.
62 See City of Bloomington v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 891 F.2d 611.615 (7th Cir. 1989) IPCBs; United States v. Hooker Chem. & Plastics Corp., 722 F.Supp.
960. 966 (W.D.N.Y. 1989) ILove Canall; Sterling v. VelsicolChem. Corp. 647 F.Supp. 303, 313 15(W.D.Tenn. 1986), aff'd in part, revad in part on orher grounds 855
F.2d 1188 (6th Cir. 1988); Behle v. Shell Pipe Line Corp., 17 S.W.2d 656, 657 (Mo. Ct. App. 1929) (dictum).
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view. 63 Strict liability is imposed most commonly in the mining and oil and gas production industries and in gasoline retailing.
I. TRESPASS
The trespass doctrine has been used in
fifty-eight water pollution cases (4 %).1 A

trespass is defined as a nonpermissive and
unprivileged physical intrusion or invasion of
another's land which violates the owner's
right to exclusive possession and to exclude
others. It includes intrusions on, beneath and
above the surface of the land." Trespass is
an entry without lawful authority,' and an
unprivileged intentional intrusion of another's
possession.7 An intention to cause the entry
is not required; an accident or mistake is
sufficient.6" The activity must be done where
it is reasonably foreseeable that intrusion by
foreign matter will occur.' Trespass, rather

than nuisance, is used when a physical invasion is involved. 70
J. UNCONSTITUTIONAL TAKING
Pollution lawsuits have been decided un-

1993
der constitutional taking and inverse condemnation theories in fourty-eight cases
(3%)." Those theories have been used only
in lawsuits involving permanent pollution
caused by governmental entities and private
entities with eminent domain power.
The federal government and state govemments are prohibited from taking property
without paying compensation. The Fifth
Amendment limiting the powers of the federal government provides that ". . . nor

shall private property be taken for public use
without just compensation."n All state constitutions have parallel prohibitions. 3 The
unconstitutional taking and inverse condemnation theories can be invoked when the
government fails to pay compensation for an
activity which constitutes a taking.7 4
Inverse condemnation is a form of unconstitutional taking.7 5 It is inverse only in the
sense that the lawsuit is brought by the
condemnee instead of the condemnor.7 6
The suit is for compensation for a condemnation which should have occurred, but did
not .n7

Most of the water pollution taking cases
are inverse condemnation cases. Many courts
have concluded that the discharge of wastes
from government-owned facilities which
causes consequential damages to private
property constitutes a taking." Takings occur when the government takes possession
of private property, when it deprives its
owner of an essential attribute of property
rights,80 when there is a nontrespassory
interference which results in a material diminution of land value,' or when there is a
substantial denial of the use of land. 2
K. STATUTORY LIABILITY
A miscellaneous collection of state statutes prohibit various activities which can
cause water pollution and impose liability for
their violation. Of these, the statutes which
generate the most cases are those prohibiting the discharge of brine from oil wells."
This theory is the sixth most commonly
used, followed in 109 cases (8%).Nearly all water pollution regulatory statutes preserve common law rights and rem-

63 RESTATEMNT 2D, TORTS §§ 519-20 (1979). See, e.g., Bunyak v. Clyde J. Yancey & Sons Dairy. Inc., 438 So.2d 891, 894 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1983): Williams v. Amoco
Prod. Co., 734 P.2d 1113. 1122-23 (Kan. 1987).
64 See Table A.
65 Rushing v. Hooper-McDonald. Inc., 300 So.2d 94, 96-97 (Ala. 1974); Wells v. State Highway Comm n, 503 S.W.2d 689, 693 (Mo. 1973). On
trespass generally, see
1 W. RoDGs, supro note . § 2.15, at 126-28; F. HARPER. F. JAMES& 0. GRAY, LAW or TORTS § 2.1, at 3 (2d ed. 1986); W. PRossR & W. KirroN. TORTS, § 13. at 67-84;
R. CUNNINCGIAM,W. STOFRLUCK
& D.WiirtaAN, LAw OF PROPERTY § 7.1, at 410-12 (stud. ed. 1984). See also RESTATEMENT
2U, ToRTs § 158 (1965).

66 Sterling v. Velsicol Chem. Corp.. 647 F.Supp. 303, 317-18 (W.D. Tenn. 1986), affd in part, rev'd in part 855 F.2d 1188 (6th Cir. 1988).
67 Wellesley Hills Really Trust v. Mobil Oil Corp., 747 F.Supp. 93, 99 (D. Mass. 1990) Isubsequent owner of land contaminated by gasoline sued prior owner for violation
of oil release liability statute & common law].
68 Sterling v. Velsicol Chem. Corp., 647 F.Supp. 303, 317-18 (W.D. Tenn. 1986). affd in part, revd in part 855 F.2d 1188 (6th Cir. 1988).

69 W.T. Ratliff Co. v. Henley. 405 So.2d 141. 145-46 (Ala. 1981) lessee's sand pile washed onto lessor's adjacent land after heavy rain)
70 Wells v. State Highway Comm n, 503 S.W.2d 689, 693 (Mo. 1973) [soil erosion silt in drainage water filled lake bed].
71 See Table A.
72 U.S. CONsT. amend. V.

73 See, e.g.. Mo. CONST. art. 1,§ 26 (1945), which provides: "That private property shall not be taken or damaged for public use without just compensation."
74 On water-related regulatory takings generally. see5 WATER AND WATER RioITs, supra note ,§ 61.03(c)(7); Klock & Cook, The Condemningof America: Regulatory -Ta kings and the Purchase by the United States of America's Wetlands. 18 SETON HAL L. REv. 330, 339-354 (1988).
75 On inverse condemnation generally, see 4 WATER ANDWATER Rict-rrs, supra note , § 38.05; J. NOWAK & R. ROTUNDA, supra note , § 11.14; 1 W. RoDGERs. supra note
, § 2.17; 2 J. SACKMAN. NiCiOs's TiiE LAw OF EMINENT DOMAIN § 6.21 (3d ed. 1990).
76 J. NowAK & R. ROTUNDA, supro note 64. § 11.14.
77 In recent years, some inverse condemnation suits have sought invalidation of excessive police power regulation. See. e.g.. Agins v. City of Tiburon. 598 P.2d 25 (Cal. 1979).
affd 447 U.S. 255 (1980). Most water pollution inverse condemnation cases seek compensation.
78 See e.g., King v. City of Rolla. 130 S.W.2d 697, 702 (Mo. Ct.App. 1939) [treated city sewage polluted livestock water & caused odorsl.
79 Evans v. City of Johnstown, 410 N.Y.S.2d 199, 201 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1978).
80 Foss v. Maine Turnpike Authority, 309 A.2d 339, 344 (Me. 1973) |snow removal operations caused salt todrain off road & polluted domestic water, killed crops & destroyed
plumbing).
81 Id.; Twitty v. State. 354 S.E.2d 296, 303 (N.C. Ct. App. 1987).
82 Crane v. Brintnall. 278 N.E.2d 703, 706 (Ohio C.P. 1972) treated sewage polluted a manmade recreational lake. causing algal bloomsl.
83 See e.g.. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 55-172 (Supp. 1992); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 143-215.93 (1992); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 52. § 296 (1991).
84 See Table A.
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edies;as however, most cases interpreting
those provisions hold that no common law
private liability arises for their violation. 6
L. PRESCRIPTION
Under the various doctrines governing
water use and allocation in water pollution
cases, the doctrine of prescription plays a
dual role. Water use rights and the right to
discharge wastes can be acquired by prescription. Prescription also can be used as a
defense against an enforcement action. Many
water pollution cases, sixty seven cases (5%)
have employed the prescription doctrine,
mostly as a defense."'
A prescriptive right, adverse and superior
to the right of the owner of the property
right, can be acquired analogously to adverse
possession." The right to pollute must be
open and notorious for the entire statutory
period. Itmust be visible or detectable enough
that the water user against whom the statute
of limitations is running either knows, or
should know, that the user's rights have been
invaded.' The discharge must be continu-

ous' and adverse, and must continue for the
entire period of the statute of limitations.9'
Periodic uses are treated as continuous if
they occur whenever the nature and circumstances of the use require."
A prescriptive right can be acquired to
discharge wastes in abrogation of riparian 9 3
prior appropriation," groundwater, or drainage rights,95 or to maintain a private nuisance." The right of the public to enjoin a
public nuisance, however, cannot be prescribed.97 Nor can the right to enjoin a public
nuisance be prescribed from a private individual with special damage.98 Notably, a
perfected prescriptive right does not protect
enlarged or changed waste discharges which
have continued for less than the period of the
statute of limitations."
M. PUBLIC TRUST DOCTRINE
The public trust doctrine is a common law
theory under which waste discharges can be
restrained and the assimilative capacity of
watercourses protected. Its principal use has
been to protect the physical integrity of

public watercourses. It has seen relatively
little use to protect those waters from pollution, being followed in only eight cases.0
Nonetheless, its potential for protecting watercourses from pollution is great.
The public trust doctrine imposes an obligation on the states, as trustees, to preserve
navigable waters for use by the public. It
provides that the state owns the beds of
public waters and the waters themselves, not
as proprietor, but as trustee for the benefit of
the public. The state cannot relinquish such
title unless the conveyance would further the
purposes of the public trust. Since the state
had original title, exercise of state powers to
enforce the public trust does not constitute a
taking, regardless of the extent to which the
private bed titles are diminished in value or
usefulness. The state as public trustee has a
minimum obligation to protect the public
rights of navigation and fishery.'' During
the twentieth century, the public trust has
been expanded to protect recreational boating, swimming, wading, hunting, and other
water-related public uses. 0 2 The public trust

85 See. e.g.. Clean Water Act § 505(e), 33 U.S.C. §1365(e) (1993); Safe Drinking Water Act § 1449(e), 42 U.S.C. § 300)-8(e) (1993); Missouri Clean Water Law, Mo. Rev.
Stat. § 644.131 (1986).
86 Middlesex County Sewerage Auth. v. National Sea Clammers Ass'n, 453 U.S. 1 (1981); Sierra Club v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng'rs, 701 F.2d 1011 (2d Cir. 1983).
87 See Tables A-D.
88 On prescription generally, see 1 WATER ANDWATi RIam supra note, § 7.04(c) 2 id. § 17.03(c); A. TARLoCK, supra note , §§ 3.19. 4.0841, 5.18131; 2 W. HUrcHINs,
supra note . 328-427: 1 W. RoDGERs, supra note . § 2.10(A); R. CuNMwMm, W. STOEBUCK & D. WirrMAN, supra note , § 8.71; 3 R. POWF. & P. ROHAN, LAW OF REAL
PRoPRr1 413(1952-92): 7 id. 111012[2ib; 2 AMERICAN LAW Of PRoPERr §§ 8.44-.63. 8.68-.69 (1952. supp. 1962); RESTATEMENT,
PROPERTY
SERVFTUDES
§§ 457-65, 47781, 506 (1944); McCoy. The Role of Adverse Possession in Water Law, 10 -any.EwvrL.. L. REV. 257, 261-266 (1986).
89 Conestee Mills v. City of Greenvlle. 158 S.E. 113, 115-16 (S.C 193l
90 Cook Indus., Inc. v. Carlson, 334 F.Supp. 809, 818 (N.D. Miss. 1971).
91 City of Cleveland v. Standard Bag & Paper Co., 74 N.E. 206, 208 (Ohio 1905).
92 Anneburg v. Kurtz, 28 S.E.2d 769, 772 (Ga. 1944).
93 City of Richmond v. Test, 48 N.E. 610. 614 (Ind. Ct.App. 1897). Kennebunk, K. & W. Water Dist. v. Maine Turnpike Auth.. 84 A.2d 433, 439-40 (Me. 1951).
94 See Joeger v. Mt. Shasta Power Corp., 276 P. 1017 (Cal. 1929); Chessman v. Hale, 79 P. 254 (Mont. 1905).
95 See Blue Ridge Poultry & Egg Co., Inc. v. Clark. 176 S.E.2d 323 (Va. 1970).
96 Smith v. City of Sedalia, 53 S.W. 907. 910 (Mo. 1899) (by implication). Notably, three cases hold that the right to abate a private nuisance cannot be prescribed. Lawton
v. Herrick, 76 A. 986. 989 (Conn. 1910); City of Oxford v. S.E. Spears, 87 So.2d 914, 917 (Miss. 1956); Vian v. Sheffield Bldg. & Dev. Co.. 88 NE-2d 410.414. (Ohio
Ct. App. 1948).
97 Gardenhire v. Sinclair Prairie Oil Co., 44 P.2d 280, 283(Kan. 1935); Gundy v. Village of Merrill, 230 N.W. 163. 163(Mich. 1930); City of Corsicana v. King, 3 S.W.2d
857. 861 (Tex. Civ. App. 1928); Meiners v. Frederick Miller Brewing Co., 47 N.W. 430, 430 (Wis. 1890).
98 Nolan v. City of New Britain, 38 A. 703, 708 (Conn. 1897).
99 Smith v. City of Sedalia. 53 S.W. 907, 910 (Mo. 1899); City of Walla Walla v. Conkey, 492 P.2d 589. 595 (Wash. Ct. App. 1971)
100 See Table A.
101 Illinois Central R.R. v.Illinois, 146 U.S. 387 (1892); National Audubon Soc y v. Superior Court. 658 P.2d 709(Cal. 1983), cert. denied464 U.S. 977 (1983. Superior
Public Rights. Inc. v. State Dep't of Natural Resources. 263 N.W.2d 290. 296 (Mich. Ct. App. 1978)_ On the public trust doctrine generally, see 4 WATER ANDWATER RIGHTS,
supra note . § 30.02; A. TARLOCK, supra note . §§ 5. 13131, 8.04-.05; Johnson, Water Pollution and the Public Trust Doctrine. 19 ENvL. L. 485 (1989); 1 W. RoDGExs,
supra note . § 2.20; Ausness. Water Rights, The Public Trust Doctrine. and the Protection of Instream Uses, 1986 U. lu.. L. RE. 407,409-16,421-28; Comment. State
Citizen Rights Respecting Great water Resource Allocation: From Rome to New Jersey, 25 Ri 1TcIR's L. Riv. 571 (1971); J. SAx. DEI.NING THr ENVIRONMrNTc. 7(1970); Sax,
The Public Trust in Natural Resources Law: Effective Judicial Intervention, 68 Mini. L. REv. 471 (1970. 2 F. GRAn. supra note , § 10.05.
102 Orion Corp. v. State. 747 P.2d 1062. 1073 (Wash. 1987), cert denied 486 U.S 1022 (1988) State v. Bleck. 338 N.W.2d 492, 498 (Wis. 1983)
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doctrine applies to all public waters navigable or floatable under state law. 03
In water pollution cases, the courts have
held that under the public trust doctrine the
state holds public waters in trust for the
benefit of the public,'"1 that the doctrine
imposes on the state an obligation to protect
the public's right to use public waters for
public uses,'0 and that the state may not
substantially impair the public's use of those
waters.' Alienation of the bed is barred by
the public trust doctrine. 07 The doctrine
applies to interferences with fishington and
the physical integrity of the waters themselves. '0

The state, as public trustee, has standing
to enforce the public trust. 0 It isnot so clear
whether members of the public, as beneficiaries of the trust, can do so. Some courts have
held that members of the public can sue the
state if it regulates water uses in derogation
of the public trust or abdicates its trust
obligations.' In some states, a member of
the public can enforce public trust rights
directly against a violator."I In other states,
however, a private individual cannot enforce
the trust."' 3
Few water pollution cases have been decided under the public trust doctrine, and all
but one of those have involved coastal waters. Maine, Maryland, and New Jersey have

applied the doctrine under federal admiralty
law"4 and state law." 5 Virginia has nominally accepted the doctrine, but holds that a
municipality has a sovereign right to discharge wastes into public waters without
liability." 6 New York has rejected use of the
doctrine in pollution cases.'
N. NO DECISIONAL THEORY CASES
A surprising number of water pollution
cases do not recite any legal theory to support their decisions. "No decisional theory"
cases compromise 154 cases (11%), thus
these are the fifth most commonly used
theory. Over half of these cases were decided
in Kansas and Oklahoma (eighty-seven cases).
About one-third of the cases in Oklahoma
were of the "no decisional theory" decisions."" Because many other cases reciting
particular legal theories were decided in
those states at the same time, it is not
possible to ascribe these no decisional theory
decisions to any particular theory. The cases
in both states are focused on brine disposal
from oil wells, refinery storage leaks, and
pipeline leaks.
Particularly curious in each of these states
is that the no decisional theory cases are
mixed among many other cases reciting
specified theories, particularly private nuisance, negligence, and statutory liability. For

example, in Oklahoma between 1935 and
1940, there were 70 decisions, of which two
oil well and six non-oil well cases used private
nuisance law: four oil well and two pipeline
leak cases applied negligence law; thirty oil
well, one pipeline leak, and one refinery spill
cases relied on a statute creating liability for
polluting domestic and livestock water supplies with oil well brine and wastes; and
twenty-nine oil well and two non-oil well
cases failed to specify a decisional theory. A
similar pattern of cases also exists in Kansas
throughout the twentieth century.
Several comments are in order. First, it
should be recognized that the cases are not
inconsistent in result. Generally, the courts
granted relief for proven pollution under
each of the theories (or non-theory). Second,
the courts more frequently did specify a
decisional theory in non-oil well cases. Third,
even in oil well cases, a majority of decisions
in Kansas and Oklahoma specified a decisional theory. However, it seems amazing
that nearly half the oil well cases in Oklahoma would fail to specify adecisional theory.
Generally, the no decisional theory cases
hold that polluting a water supply or well was
unlawful and granted relief. Fourth, underlying all oil well cases in Kansas and Oklahoma
are statutes, cited in eighteen Kansas (56%)
and sixty-six Oklahoma cases (62%), which

103 Hayes v. State. 496 S.W.2d 372, 375 (Ark. 1973); Kerpelman v. Maryland Bd. of Public Works, 276 A.2d 56, 61 (Md. 1971). cert. denied 404 U S. 858 (1971);
Muench v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 53 N.W.2d 514, 519, 55 N.W.2d 40, 45 (Wis. 1952); see on navigability generally, 4 WATER ANDWATER RicHrs, supra note §§ 32.01.03; Ausness. Water Rights, The Public Trust Doctrine, and the Protection of Instream Uses, 1986 U. ILu.L. REv. 407, 433-34 (1986): Davis, State Ownership of Beds
of Inland Waters- A Summary and Reexamination, 57 NEB. L. REv. 665. 674-76 nn. 50-51, 680-81 nn. 68-71. 699-700 n. 152 (1978); Johnson & Austin. Recreational
Rights and Titles to Beds on Western Lakes and Streams, 7 NAT. RESOURCES
J. 1, 33-52 (1967).
104 Commonwealth v. City of Newport News, 164 S.E. 689, 691 (Va. 1932).
105 City of Hampton v. Watson, 89 S.E. 81 (Va. 1916).
106 Commonwealth v. City of Newport News, 164 S.E. 689, 691 (Va. 1932).
107 Evans v. City of Johnstown, 410 N.Y.S.2d 199, 207 ( N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1978) (dictum) [doctrinerejectedl.
108 Id.; Commonwealth v. City of Newport News, 164 S.E. 689, 691 (Va. 1932).
109 Maine v. MV Tamano. 357 F.Supp. 1097. 1099-1101 (D. Me. 1973).
110 Kerpelman v. Maryland Bd. of Public Works, 276 A.2d 56, 61 (Md. 1971). cert. denied 404 U.S. 858 (1971); State v. Deetz, 224 N.W.2d 407. 413 (Wis. 1974).
111 See e.g.. Muench v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 53 N.W.2d 514. 522, 55 N.W.2d 40 (Wis. 1952)
112 See e.g.. Mai. COMP. L. ANN. § 691.1202 (1987) (MicH. STAT. ANN. § 14.528(202) (Callaghan 1980); State v. Deetz, 224 N.W.2d 407. 413 (Wis. 1974).
113 See e.g., Kerpelman v. Maryland Bd. of Public Works, 276 A.2d 56,60 (Md. 1971). cert. denied 404 U.S. 858 (1971).
114 Burgess v. MAVTamano, 370 F.Supp. 247 (D. Me. 1973), offd mem. 559 F.2d 1200 (1st Cir. 1977).
115 Maine v. MV Tamano, 357 F.Supp. 1097 (D. Me. 1973); Maryland, Dep't of Natural Resources v. Amerada Hess Corp.. 350 F.Supp. 1060 (D. Md. 1972); State,
Dep't of Enut'l Prot. v. Jersey Cent. Power & Light Co.. 351 A.2d 337 (N.J. 1976).
116 Commonwealth v. City of Newport News, 164 S.E. 689 (Va. 1932)1sewage polluted oyster bed in navigable watersi.
117 Evans v. City of Johnstown, 410 N.Y.S.2d 199. 207 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1978).
118 See Tables A-D.
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prohibited polluting a domestic or livestock
water supply with brine or wastes discharged
from an oil and gas well."' Probably, the
existence of those statutes was so well known
that they formed the unstated basis for the no
decisional theory cases involving oil well
discharges.
The dominance of private nuisance, public nuisance, negligence, and riparian rights
doctrines suggests that many plaintiffs are
not aware of the other doctrines which may
be used to deal with water pollution problems. The large proportion of no decisional
theory cases in Oklahoma (31%) and Kansas
(18%), however, suggests that lawyers pleading plaintiffs' cases and judges may be unaware of any of the doctrines which might be

used.120
PART II
PATTERNS IN FACT SITUATIONS AND
DOCTRINES IN CASES IN MISSOURI
AND THE MIDWEST
Kansas, Missouri, and Oklahoma have
had 375 cases, over twenty percent of the
common law water pollution decisions reported nationwide. As shown in Table A, in
Kansas and Missouri, private nuisance dominates the water pollution cases. In Kansas,
private nuisance is followed by statutory
liability, while in Missouri it is followed by
negligence. In Oklahoma, "no decisional

theory" and statutory liability dominate, followed by negligence and private nuisance.
In three other surrounding states, as well,
Arkansas, Illinois and Iowa, private nuisance
dominates, followed by negligence in Arkansas, public nuisance and riparian rights in
Illinois, and riparian rights in Iowa. These
trends remain fairly constant, with some
variation when looking at the specific types
of impacted watercourse, as shown in Tables
B-D.
In Missouri and Oklahoma, the largest
number of cases concern surface water pollution, while in Kansas, the largest number of
cases concern groundwater pollution. Some
variations may be attributable to the fact that
Oklahoma has much more pollution from oil
and gas development than does Missouri.
Kansas, however, also has more oil and gas
development than Missouri, yet shows different case trends than Oklahoma.
Interestingly, as shown in Table E,in most
states in the region, including Missouri, plaintiffs were successful in over 70 percent of the
cases with relief generally in the form of
damages. In Iowa, however, plaintiffs were
successful in only sixty-one percent of the
cases with relief generally in the form of
damages, in line with the national pattern.
Only in Illinois did injunctions form an important element of relief.
This article intends to enlarge understand-

4
119 KAN. STAT. ANN. § 55-90 (aXl) (Supp. 1992) [regulatory authority over brine disposal); OKL.
(1991) Ipollution of livestock water with oil well brinel.
120 See Table A.
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ing of the doctrines used in water pollutior
cases along with other factors present in thE
cases. To accomplish this, I have outlinet
how these doctrines apply in water pollutior
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KEYz PrN-Private Nuisance
PuN-Public Nuisance
Neg-Neligence
RR-Riparian Rights
PA-Prior Appropristion GW-Groundwater Allocation Rules
DSW-Diffumed Surface Water
SLStrict Liability
T-Trespass UT-UnconstitutionalTaking
SI-Statutory Liability
NDT-No Decisional Theory
PT-Public Trust
TT-Total
Table A
WATER POLLUTION CASES
(state v. doctrine - 1401 cases)
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Table B
WATER POLLUTION CASES -- SURFACE WATERCOURSES
(state v. doctrine - 1401 cases)
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Table C
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Table E
WA TER POUITON CASES - RELIEF GRANTED
(state v. remedy - 1401 casra)
NO RELlEF
remand
facts
law
1
4
3
5
6
1
5
3
8
5
2
23
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6
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155
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subtot
4
5

7
3
7
25
218

188
.. .... .. . .. .. .. .... .. ...

total
20
34
18
38
39
172
1057

Patterns in Common Law Water Pollution Cases
APPENDIX
MISSOURI WATER POLLUTION CASES
CASENAME, CITATION
DESCRIPTION
PRIVATE NUISANCE
Surface Watercourses
Frank v. Environmental Sanitation Management, Inc., 687 S.W.2d 876 (Mo. 1985).
(landfill leachate escaping into stream polluted livestock water)

damages

Bartlett v. Hume-Sinclair Coal Mining Co., 351 S.W.2d 214 (Mo.App. 1961).
(mine tailings polluted livestock water and killed crops)

damages

Hillhouse v. City of Aurora, 351 S.W.2d 214 (Mo.App. 1961).
(city sewage caused odors around house)

remand for trial

Newman v. City of El Dorado Springs, 292 S.W.2d 314 (Mo.App. 1956).
(city sewage polluted livestock water and caused odors around house)

damages

Divelbiss v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 272 S.W.2d 839 (Mo.App. 1954).
(oil well brine killed livestock)

damages

Stewart v. City of Springfield, 350 Mo. 234, 165 S.W.2d 626 (1942).
(city sewage polluted stream)

no: statute of limitations

Thompson v. City of Springfield, 134 S.W.2d 1082 (Mo.App. 1939).
(city sewage caused odors)

no: statute of limitations

Person v. City of Independence, 114 S.W.2d 175 (Mo.App. 1938).
(city sewage caused odors around house)

remand for trial

Riggs v. City of Springfield, 96 S.W.2d 392 (Mo.App. 1936), rev'd 126 S.W.2d 1144 (Mo.App. 1939).
(city sewage caused odors around house)

damages

City of Harrisonvillev. W.S. Dickey Clay Mfg. Co., 289 U.S. 234 (1933),
rev'd on other grounds 61 F.2d 210 (8th Cir. 1932).
(inadequately treated city sewage damaged a pasture)

damages, no injunction

McCleery v. City of Marshall, 65 S.W.2d 1042 (Mo.App. 1933).
(sewer extension discharged in ravine polluted stream & caused odors around farm)

damages

City of Harrisonville v. W.S. Dickey Clay Mfg. Co., 61 F.2d 210 (8th Cir. 1932 - Mo.),
rev'd on other grounds 289 U.S. 334 (1933).
(inadequately treated city sewage damaged a pasture)

damages, injunction

Kent v. City of Trenton, 48 S.W.2d 571 (Mo. 1931).
(city sewage polluted domestic & livestock water and caused odors around house)

no: prescription

Fansler v. City of Sedalia, 176 S.W. 1102 (Mo.App. 1915).
(city sewage polluted livestock water)

damages

Luckey v. City of Brookfield, 151 S.W. 201 (Mo. App. 1912).
(city sewage polluted livestock water)

no: statute of limitations

Kellogg v. City of Kirksville, 112 S.W.2d 296 (Mo.App. 1908) and 129 S.W. 57 (1910)
(city sewage polluted domestic & livestock water and caused odors around house)

damages
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Smith v. City of Sedalia, 81 S.W. 165 (Mo. 1904).
(city sewage polluted domestic & livestock water)

damages

City of Chillicothe v. Bryan, 77 S.W. 465 (Mo.App. 1903).
(city sewage polluted livestock water)

no: causation absent

Schumacher v. Shawhan, 67 S.W. 717 (Mo.App. 1902).
(food processing wastes polluted domestic & livestock water)

injunction

Smith v. City of Sedalia, 53 S.W. 907 (Mo. 1899).
(city sewage polluted domestic & livestock water)

no: comparative convenience
doctrine

Martinowsky v. City of Hannibal, 35 Mo.App. 70 (1889).
(city sewage caused odors around house)

no: not proven

Smiths v. McConathy, 11 Mo. 518 (1848).
(meat processing wastes & farm animal wastes polluted domestic & livestock water and
caused odors around house)

remand for trial

Percolating Groundwater
Village of Claycomo v. Kansas City, 635 S.W.2d 365 (Mo.App. 1980).
(leachate from landfill polluted groundwater and wells)

remand for trial

Shelley v. Ozark Pipe Line Corp., 37 S.W.2d 518 (Mo. 1931),
rev'd 2 S.W.2d 115 (Mo.App. 1927)
(pipeline leak pollute domestic well)

damages

Haynor v. Excelsior Springs Light, Power, Heat & Water Co., 108 S.W. 580 (Mo.App. 1908).
(oil & grease escaping into creek polluted domestic well)

no: procedural error

Diffused Surface Water
Hulshof v. Noranda Aluminum, Inc., 835 S.W.2d 411 (Mo. App. 1992).
(industrial drainage water containing wastes & toxic chemicals in drainage ditch inundated
farm, killing crops & contaminating soil)

injunction

Clark v. City of Springfield, 241 S.W.2d 100 (Mo.App. 1951).
(city combined sewer overflow flowed onto residential land, causing odors around houses &
polluting domestic well)

damages

Bower v. Hog Builders, Inc., 461 S.W.2d 784 (Mo. 1970).
(feedlot sewage lagoon effluent, with accumulated surface water, flowed past farmhouse, caused
odors & polluted livestock pond)

damages

Surface Contaminant Flow (without drainage water)
Bower v. Hog Builders, Inc. [see Diffused Surface Water]

damages

PUBLIC NUISANCE
Surface Watercourses
State ex rel. Dresser Indus., Inc. v. Ruddy, 592 S.W.2d 789 (Mo. 1980).
(barite mine settling basin ruptured, discharging mine tailings into river)

remand for trial

Stewart v. City of Springfield [see Private Nuisance)

no: statute of limitations

State ex rel. Wear v. Springfield Gas & Elec. Co., 204 S.W. 942 (Mo.App. 1918).
(industrial waste polluted livestock water and killed fish)

no: not proven

I
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Schoen v. Kansas City, 65 Mo.App. 134 (1895)
(city sewage polluted stream & caused odors around houses)

remand for trial

Edmondson v. City of Moberly, 11 S.W. 990 (Mo. 1889).
(city sewage polluted stream & caused odors around house)

remand for trial
NEGLIGENCE

Percolating Groundwater
Reddick v. Pippin, 421 S.W.2d 225 (Mo. 1967).
(sewage lagoon overflow allegedly polluted domestic well)

no: no causal connection

Bollinger v. Mungle, 175 S.W.2d 912 (Mo.App. 1943).
(gas station gasoline leak polluted domestic well)

no violation of right

Ozark Pipe Line Corp. v. Decker, 32 F.2d 66 (8th Cir. 1929).
(oil pipeline leaks polluted domestic & livestock well)

no: no causal connection

Shelley v. Ozark Pipe Line Corp., 2 S.W.2d 115 (Mo.App. 1927),
rev'd on other grounds 37 S.W.2d 518 (Mo. 1931).
(pipeline leak polluted domestic well)

procedural error

Chapman v. American Creosoting Co., 286 S.W. 837 (Mo.App. 1926).
(creosote escaping into ditch saturated ground and polluted domestic well)

procedural error

Shelley v. Ozark Pipe Line Corp., 247 S.W. 472 (Mo.App. 1923).
(pipeline leak polluted domestic well)

damages

Haynor v. Excelsior Springs Light, Power, Heat & Water Co. [see Private Nuisance]

procedural error

Diffused Surface Water
Casanover v. Villanova Realty Co., 209 S.W.2d 556 (Mo.App. 1948).
(subdivision drainage scoured driveways, penetrated basement walls & left clay deposit on land)

no: not entitled to relief under rule

RIPARIAN RIGHTS: REASONABLE USE RULE
Surface Watercourses
City of Cape Girardeau v. Hunze, 284 S.W. 471 (Mo. 1926).
sewer might pollute stream; "reasonable use" applied in eminent domain case)
Joplin Consol. Mining Co. v. City of Joplin, 27 S.W. 406 (Mo. 1894).
(city sewage might pollute ore washing water)

eminent domain compensation (city
amount upehld
no: procedural error

DIFFUSED SURFACE WATER RULES: COMMON ENEMY RULE
Diffused Surface Water
Wells v. State Highway Comm'n, 503 S.W.2d 689 (Mo. 1973).
(soil erosion silt in drainage water filled lake bed)

damages

Casanover v. Villanova Realty Co. [see Negligence]

no: not entitled to relief under rule
TRESPASS

Diffused Surface Water
Wells v. State Highway Comm'n [see Diffused Surface Water-Common Enemy]

damages
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UNCONSTITUTIONAL TAKING
Surface Watercourses
Lewis v. City of Potosi, 317 S.W.2d 623 (Mo.App. 1958).
(treated city sewage polluted domestic & livestock water)
King v. City of Rolla, 130 S.W.2d 697 (Mo.App. 1939).
(treated city sewage polluted livestock water & caused odors)

damages
no: statute of limitations

Riggs v. City of Springfield, 126 S.W.2d 1144 (1939),
rev'd 96 S.W.2d 392 (Mo.App. 1936).
(city sewage caused odors around house)

no: statute of limitations

Smith v. City of Sedalia, 149 S.W. 597 (Mo. 1912).
(city sewer polluted a stream at a farm)

res judicata

Diffused Surface Water
Wells v. State Highway Comm'n [see Diffused Surface Water-Common Enemy]

damages

PRESCRIPTION
Surface Watercourses
Riggs v. City of Springfield [see Unconstitutional Taking]

no: stat. of limitations

Kent v. City of Trenton [see Private Nuisance

prescriptive rt. acquired

Fansler v. City of Sedalia [see Private Nuisance]

damages

City of Chillicothe v. Bryan [see Private Nuisance]

prescriptive rt. acquired

Smith v. City of Sedalia [see Private Nuisance]

no: comparative convenience doctrine
NO DECISIONAL THEORY

Surface Watercourses
Lewis v. City of Potosi, 348 S.W.2d 577 (Mo.App. 1961).
(treated city sewage polluted domestic & livestock water)

damages

Percolating Groundwater
Windle v. City of Springfield, 8 S.W.2d 61 (Mo. 1928),
transferred from 275 S.W. 585 (Mo. App. 1925).
(city sewage discharged into cave polluted spring & lake and caused odors)

damages

Diffused Surface Water
Manner v. H.E.T., Inc., 739 S.W.2d 724 (Mo.App. 1987).
(subdivision construction caused mud & debris to flow with surface water
onto neighbor's land)

no: no causal connection

GROUNDWATER ALLOCATION RULES
STRICT LIABILITY
STATUTORY LIABILITY
PUBIC TRUST DOCTRINE
There were no Missouri cases using these theories.
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